Tomás Domínguez Arévalo


The Count of Rodezno
Born
Tomás Domínguez Arévalo

1882
Died1952
NationalitySpanish
Occupationlandowner
Known forpolitician
Political partyCT

Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, 6th Count of Rodezno, 12th Marquis of San Martin (1882–1952) was a Spanish Carlist and Francoist politician. He is known mostly as the first Francoist Minister of Justice (1938–1939). He is also recognised for his key role in negotiating Carlist access to the coup of July 1936 and in emergence of carlo-francoism, the branch of Carlism which actively engaged in the Francoist regime.

Family and youth

father

Tomás Domínguez y de Arévalo Romera y Fernández Navarrete was a descendant of two landowner families from the very south and from the very north of Spain. The paternal Domínguez family has been for centuries related to the Andalusian town of Carmona (Seville province). Its first representatives were noted as regidores in the 18th century and intermarried with another distinguished local family, the Romeras. Their descendant was Tomás' father, Tomás Domínguez Romera (1848–1931), who inherited the local Campo de la Plata estate. He demonstrated political sympathies hardly typical for the region siding with the legitimists during the Third Carlist War and had to leave the country afterwards. Following the amnesty he returned to Spain and at unspecified date he married María de Arévalo y Fernandez de Navarrete (1854–1919), descendant to a Riojan-Navarrese Arévalo family. Her father, Justo Arévalo y Escudero, was a well known conservative politician; in the mid-19th century he served in the Cortes and later as a long-time senator from Navarre (1876–1891). As at the time of the marriage she was already condesa de Rodezno, Tomás Domínguez Romera became conde consorte.

None of the sources consulted clarifies whether the couple initially settled in the Arévalo's Navarrese estate in Villafranca or in Madrid. In the late 1880s Tomás Domínguez Romera emerged holding major posts within the Madrid Carlist structures. In 1888 he was president of comisión de propaganda of the Madrid Junta Directiva del Circula Tradicionalista de Madrid the same year elected its secretario general, but when unsuccessfully running for the Cortes in the 1890s, he stood in Haro (Logroño province). He emerged triumphant in 4 successive elections between 1905 and 1914, voted in from the Navarrese district of Aoiz. At that time he was already member of the national Carlist executive; in 1912 he entered Junta Nacional Tradicionalista representing Castilla La Nueva, in 1913 entered comisión de Tesoro de la Tradición and chaired party gatherings interchanging with the likes of Cerralbo, Feliu or de Mella.

mother

It is not clear whether Tomás Domínguez Arévalo spent his early childhood in the capital or in Villafranca. He was then educated in the Jesuit Colegio de San Isidoro in Madrid, at unspecified date commencing law studies at the University of Madrid; he followed classes of the then Carlist political leader, Matías Barrio y Mier. It is during his academic years that Domínguez came to know Jaime Chicharro and Luis Hernando de Larramendi, active in Juventud Jaimista but also in literary and artistic circles. He graduated in 1904; some authors, contemporary press and the official Cortes service refer to him as "abogado", though none of the sources consulted confirms that he practiced as a lawyer. Urbane and gregarious, in 1917 Domínguez married Asunción López-Montenegro y García Pelayo, descendant to a wealthy aristocratic terrateniente family from Cáceres, with its representatives holding prestigious posts in the city and in the province. The couple settled in Villafranca; they had one child, María Domínguez y López-Montenegro. Following the death of his mother in 1919, in 1920 Tomás Domínguez Arévalo inherited the title of conde de Rodezno; following the death of his father in 1931 he became marqués de San Martín.

Early political career

Carlist electoral meeting, ca 1910

There is almost no information on Domínguez's public activity in the first decade of the 20th century; he was probably active in Juventud Jaimista and Juventud Hispanoamericana. In 1909 he published his first work, a booklet dedicated to medieval rulers of Navarre, followed by articles in scholarly reviews focusing on history of the province and short biographical studies, also anchored in history of Navarre. Domínguez also tried his hand in Pamplona dailies as a literary critic. Some authors claim that his first public assignment was mayorship of Villafranca, but when first running for seat in the Cortes, he was referred to by the press only as "joven abogado y escritor".

Domínguez's entry into politics was facilitated by memory of his late maternal grandfather and especially by standing of his father, one of the most distinguished politicians of Navarre; his position is dubbed as "cacicato" and the Aoiz district was considered his personal fiefdom. It is not known why he decided not to renew his mandate in the 1916 campaign. Initially Domínguez Romera was to be substituted as Jaimista candidate by Joaquín Argamasilla, but in unclear circumstances the latter was replaced by Domínguez Arévalo. Argamasilla stroke back with a pamphlet, lambasting alleged alliance with the liberals and charging his substitute with flexibility bordering opportunism. Though resident of another Navarrese district of Tafalla, Domínguez Arévalo was also presented as a cuckoo candidate. Despite the critique, he was narrowly elected; he renewed his ticket, though also marginally, in the 1918 campaign in the same district.

Juan Vazquez de Mella

At that time Carlism was increasingly paralyzed by tension between its top theorist Vazquez de Mella and the claimant Don Jaime; Domínguez was counted among supporters of the former. According to some historians he considered orthodox Carlism a dead-end street given the Carlist dynasty was already certain to extinguish. He shared de Mella's vision of a grand extreme-right coalition, which would be new possibilist reincarnation of Traditionalism; he also considered sort of transfer of legitimist rights to the Alfonsine dynasty. However, at the 1919 moment of breakup he decided to stay loyal to Don Jaime, even given discrepancies between him and his king were already public.

In the 1919 campaign Domínguez Arévalo presented his bid in Aoiz, but lost to a Maurista candidate by the smallest margin possible. In 1920 the same two hopefuls competed in the same district; this time Domínguez, already conde de Rodezno, lost more decisively, the visible sign of increasingly loose Carlist grip on Navarre. A mere week after the defeat he presented his candidature to the Senate. As indirect elections to the upper chamber were more about behind-the-stage party dealings rather than about seeking popular vote, the Jaimistas managed to negotiate Rodezno's success. He was also re-elected for the successive term in 1922. His activity as recorded in the Senate archive was insignificant. One of his few interventions referred to tariffs on cork exports, the issue he was personally interested in as there was cork produced on his Andalusian Carmona estate.

Dictatorship

Rodezno with knights of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta

Advent of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship suspended Rodezno's parliamentarian career. Having lost his senate mandate he abandoned politics and is not listed as active in any of the primoderiverista institutions, be it either Somatén, Unión Patriotica or any other organization. However, he did not withdraw from public life. Rodezno took part in various Christian activities, contributed to cultural initiatives, remained engaged in Carlist structures and pursued his career as author and historian, at the same time dedicating his time to family and business.

A member of the Catholic aristocracy, Rodezno was active in the Sovereign Military Order of Malta and remained on good terms with Spanish hierarchy and the papal nuncio. He forged particularly good relationship with Pedro Segura, welcoming the new bishop in Caceres, 6 years later greeting him as new archbishop of Burgos during the homage celebrations in the same city, and in 1928 taking part in Toledo celebrations following Segura's ascendance to the primate of Spain. On the more practical side, adhering to Segura's knack for social action he co-organized Acción Social Diocesana in Caceres and gave lectures during various initiatives like Semana Social, organized by Acción Católica.

Alfonso de Borbon and Miguel Primo de Rivera

Rodezno's cultural activities were strongly flavored by Carlism. In Pamplona he organized anniversary homage celebrations to veterans of the Third Carlist War, in San Sebastián he took part in works of Sociedad de Estudios Vascos when preparing "La exposición de las Guerras Civiles" of the 19th century, and in Madrid he co-organized fundraising and himself donated large sums to the planned monument of Vazquez de Mella. However, he became most noted for his historical effort. Apart from inedita, in 1928 he published La princesa de Beira y los hijos de D. Carlos and in 1929 Carlos VII, duque de Madrid, monographs dedicated to already mythical Carlist figures; both books were widely discussed on literary pages of the Spanish press of the day. Though they pursued a personal approach of the author, both remain quoted and referenced also by present-day scholars.

Rodezno and his wife held land estates scattered across Spain: in Navarre, inherited from his mother; in Extremadura, brought into the marriage by his wife; and in Andalusia, inherited from his father. Some authors refer to him as "grande terrateniente" "cacique terrateniente", "grandee proprietor" or "prominent landowner", an exemplary case of link between landownership and power, though exact size of his holdings is unclear and probably did not exceed 500 ha combined. He was head of Federacion Catolico Agraria de Navarra, co-founder of Asociación de Terratenientes de Navarra and member of Asociacion de Propietarios de Alcornocales. On behalf of some of these pressure groups he held talks with various ministers, publishing also analytical studies on agricultural credit and land ownership. In his opinion in terms of rural property the Navarrese structure was close to ideal, almost reaching the objective "que todos los agricultores fueran propietarios"; later in the republic he defended the arrendamiento structure.

Jefe

Don Jaime

Though mostly dormant in times of the dictatorship, during Dictablanda Carlism assumed more active stance. In June 1930 the new Navarrese junta with Rodezno its member was set up, an attempt to enforce more cautious policy towards Basque nationalism and to shift focus from foral to religious issues. The move might have backfired following declaration of the Republic, as the Carlists decided to forge electoral coalition with PNV; when concluded as "lista católico-fuerista" it enabled Rodezno, elected from Navarre, to resume his parliamentary career in 1931. In the Cortes he was the least-Basque minded among Carlist deputies; he ceased to support the autonomy draft when it turned out that it would not allow autonomous religious policy and started to toy with the idea of an exclusively Navarrese statute.

Already in the late 1920s advocating reconciliation with the Mellistas, Rodezno more than welcomed re-unification of three Traditionalist streams in the new organization, Comunión Tradicionalista. Early 1932 he was appointed to its Supreme National Junta, intended to assist the ailing Jefe Delegado, marqués de Villores. After his death in May that year Rodezno was nominated its president, effectively becoming the Carlist political leader.

Rodezno was acutely sensitive to threat of revolution and convinced that democracy could not contain it; he responded warmly to the mood of authoritarian nationalism, covering in his opinion a broad spectrum from fascist Mussolini regime to MacDonald’s National Government. Hostile especially to militant republican secularism and agrarian reform, he remained vehement opponent in the parliament and was once hit by a flying glass in return. Touring the country he boasted that “Carlist shock troops are ready to defend society against Marxist threat”. However, he was not among those pressing an insurgent strategy. Aware of the planned Sanjurjo coup he steered clear of direct collaboration, which did not spare him expropriations administered by the government afterwards.

Rodezno at Carlist meeting, 1932

Rodezno's term as the leader emphasized politics and propaganda rather than organization and militancy; some scholars claim that obsolete structures of Communión, favoring "placentera y anárquica autonomia", could not bear the weight of dynamically growing movement. This, combined with internal protest against pro-Alfonsist advances and his "tactica transaccionista y el gradualismo", brought about a major challenge. When former Integrists suggested that Manuel Fal become president of the Junta, Rodezno proposed he rather become personal secretary to the claimant. As Don Alfonso Carlos at that time decided to abandon plans of dynastic reconciliation, in April 1934 Rodezno agreed to step down from leadership. He remained the local Navarrese jefe.

Conspiracy and coup

requetés in captured Donostia, 1936

Though Rodezno's supporters complained about "fascistización" of the Communion under the new leadership of Fal, Carlism firmly changed course from political negotiations to organizational build-up. Rodezno was not appointed head of any of the newly created sections, nominated to Consejo de Cultura instead. Fal initially considered Rodezno an acceptable leader and insisted on changing structures rather than people. He criticised Rodezno rather for lack of faith. Re-elected to the Cortes in 1933 and 1936, Rodezno became chairman of the 10-men Carlist minority. He was permitted to pursue talks with the Alfonsinos on the private business basis; in 1936 these contacts started to take shape of negotiating a joint insurgency. According to one source he was on the target list of the hit-team which, in his absence, shot Calvo Sotelo instead.

Rodezno played vital role in negotiating Carlist role in the military coup. Talks between Mola and Fal stalled as both failed to reach a compromise on terms of the Carlist access; at that point the general opened parallel talks with Navarrese leaders, headed by Rodezno. Bypassing Fal and ready to confront him if needed, they suggested that Navarrese issues are discussed locally and offered requeté support in return for usage of monarchist flag and assurance that Navarre would be left as Carlist political fiefdom. Facing sort of internal rebellion, Fal considered dismissing the entire Navarrese junta. He was finally outmaneuvered when Rodezno and the Navarros assured conditional support of claimants' envoy, Don Javier; Mola and Fal decided to act together on the basis of a vague letter, sent by pre-agreed leader of the insurgency, general Sanjurjo.

During the coup Rodezno was in Pamplona, the city easily captured by insurgents. Though Fal considered him disloyal, in late August he had no option but to include Domínguez in Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra, a newly constituted Carlist wartime executive; within this body he entered Section of General Affairs heading Delegación Política, a sub-section entrusted with handling relations with military junta and local authorities. Rodezno settled in the emergent military headquarters in Salamanca, but went on pursuing independent policy engineered by a local Navarrese executive, transformed into Junta Central Carlista de Guerra de Navarra. Following death of the claimant and assumption of regent duties by his successor Don Javier, the so-called Rodeznistas were visibly disappointed with Fal's confirmation as political leader in October 1936.

Carlist standard

The Carlists, who initially imagined their position as equals of the military, within few months acknowledged that they were being reduced to junior role, especially that despite mobilization of their supporters, Falange attracted far more recruits. Their attempt to safeguard autonomous standing crashed in December 1936, when following Fal's decision to set up a Carlist military academy he was summoned to Franco's headquarters and presented with the choice between firing squad and exile abroad. Some authors speculate whether the unusual overreaction of Franco was not intended to get rid of Fal and replace him with complacent Rodezno. At the Carlist emergency meeting the Rodeznistas enforced the decision to comply with the exile alternative, though later Rodezno himself visited Franco trying to get Jefe Delegado re-admitted.

Unification

Francisco Franco

With Fal on exile and party leadership assumed by France-based Don Javier, Rodezno emerged as "maxima figura carlista en España"; Fal was not happy about Rodezno's pre-eminence and when on exile intended to send him abroad, possibly on a diplomatic mission to Vatican. Starting January 1937 he and other party bigwigs were approached by the military and the Falangists about forming a monopolist state party; the pressure started to mount later on. The Carlist leaders met 3 times to address the challenge: in Insua (February), in Burgos (March) and in Pamplona (April), all attended by Rodezno. He and the faction he headed advocated compliance with political amalgamation, pressed by the military; they were confronted by the Falcondistas, opting for intransigence. As the formal party executive Junta Nacional was getting decomposed and theoretically local, Rodeznista-dominated Junta Central assumed a key role, the balance tipped towards unification. The fusion was presented as means to build a new state, Catholic, regionalist, social and ultimately formatted as Traditionalist monarchy.

On April 22 Rodezno was nominated to Secretariado Político of the new party, Falange Española Tradicionalista, one of 4 Carlists within the 10-member body. The Falangists like Giron were extremely unhappy about its performance and composition, with very few members "fielmente el espiritu de nuestro Movimiento". He and other Carlists learned of the party program only once its 21 points were announced and immediately demonstrated some unease. His relations with Fal and Don Javier remained extremely tense, though falling short of total breakup; both considered him a fronding rebel; he was held among, "maximos responsables de la actitud de rebeldia mantenida por el carlismo navarro frente a la autoridad de don Javier". Rodezno's efforts to elicit authorization from the regent produced no effect. During the next few months he presided over absorption into Falange rather than a fusion, bombarded with queries and protests from Carlist rank-and-file about total predomination and arrogance of camisas azules. Possibly as a result of complaints about the Falangists' lack of give and take in October 1937 Franco called up theoretically governing structure of the party, the National Council; Despite Fal's calls to decline, Rodezno accepted the seat and in December 1937 Don Javier expulsed him from Carlism; Rodezno did not take notice. Some authors claim he was expulsed already in the spring, following accepting post in Secretariado.

Falangist standard

Rodezno's motives are unclear; apart from partisan claims that he traded Carlist principles for a few Navarrese alcaldias, there are many conflicting interpretations offered. According to one, he feared that internal divisions within the Nationalist camp might lead to defeat in the war. According to another, he has never been a genuine Carlist and is better described as a conservative monarchist. Some scholars claim that he was a possibilist, who realized that Traditionalism was unable to seize power single-handedly and needed coalition partners; one more clue might have been that perceiving Carlism as rooted in family and regional values, he downplayed the issues of organization and structures. Others underline that he considered the emerging system largely in line with the Carlist vision and did not think it worthwhile to be marginalized for the sake of defending second-rate discrepancies. Finally, there are authors who believe that he realized neither gravity of the moment nor totalitarian nature of the new party; Rodezno – the theory goes – imagined the structure either as a new incarnation of Unión Patriotica or as a loose alliance, both permitting Carlism to maintain its proper identity; immediately following announcement of the FET programme, largely a copy-paste from the original Falange 27 points, Rodezno visited Franco to voice his disgust; following three months he ceased to attend sittings of the FET secretariat, considering it pointless.

Francoism

prison, Spain

In January 1938 Rodezno entered the first regular Francoist government as Minister of Justice. At this position he commenced work on revoking the Republican laws, focusing mostly on the laic legislation. Though the task was completed by his successor, it was Rodezno who ensured that the Church re-took a key role in a number of areas, especially education, and that intimate Church-state relations were restored. When setting the direction he had to overcome the Falangist resistance and outmaneuver its key exponents, Jordana and Yanguas; in 1942 Rodezno managed to defeat "serranistas" drafting the future legislation. He is best remembered, however, for his role in Francoist repressions. Wartime purges rested on most tortured juridical basis and produced some 72,000 executions; it is difficult to tell to what extent Rodezno might be held liable, especially that most of them were carried out under military jurisdiction and before he assumed office. According to some sources, he was "responsable de la firma de unas 50.000 penas de muerte"; according to scholars, there were some 51,000 death sentences administered during the first few years after the War; most of that time it was Esteban Bilbao holding the post of Minister of Justice. He started to replace the chaotic practice by laying the foundations of the repressive Francoist judicial system, including massive purges in the judiciary. Its first pillar, Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas, retroactive to 1934, was adopted in 1939, supplemented by many other laws and regulations. One of them required all persons of legal age to hold a personal ID card, obligation introduced for the first time in Spanish history. There were some 100,000 political prisoners before he stepped down as minister in August 1939. None of the sources consulted provide information on the mechanism of Rodezno leaving the office, especially whether he resigned or was dismissed.

Francoist Spain, 1939

It is not clear whether Rodezno's departure from the government was related to tension between the Falangists and the Carlists, though he was on rather poor terms with Serrano Suñer. Serrano described Rodezno in his memoirs as follows: "era alto, de rostro afilado, con un gesto entre triste y burlón; con su ademán mezclado de solemnidad, indolencia y cortesía. Era puntillosamente leal a sus tradiciones, aunque políticamente parecía más consecuente que creyente..." The two clashed especially on issues related to centralisation and regional rights. Serrano intervened to make sure the address of Rodezno, delivered when accepting the hijo predilecto title from Navarrese diputación, is not distributed. Already in early 1938 heavily disappointed with the new party, in April 1938 Rodezno complained to Franco about marginalisation of Carlism and apparently managed to extract from caudillo a fairly frank opinion; the generalissimo valued the Carlists higher than the Falangists, yet noted that they were "pocos y sin atractivo pasa los masas", while Falange enjoyed "capacidad proselitista y captadora", and the emering regime in general. Rodezno admitted that "no dejaba de sentirse cierta tristeza por el desengaño y la decepción que producía la disparidad entre el esfuerzo aportado y el rumbo amenazador de las cosas para el porvenir". In 1939 he moved back to Navarre. Though expelled from formally illegal Comunión Tradicionalista he was eager to take part in the movement, e.g. in 1939 he took part in the first Montejurra ascent, riding all the way to the summit on the horse. Some authors consider him leader of Rodeznistas, the informal collaborative faction, other scholars prefer to name him leader of Navarrese Carlism or even of Spanish Carlism altogether. In the immediate post-war period he tried to support Carlist cultural outposts, either preventing their amalgamation in the Francoist machinery, or creating the new ones. Some orthodox Carlists considered him indispensable, as it was with their support that Rodezno was elected vice-president of Navarrese Diputación Provincial in 1940. At this post he took part in provincial battle for power against the Falangists and clashed with some of their leaders also on the national level; in June 1939 Rodezno clashed with the Falangist pundit Gimenez Caballero, who in accused Navarre of historical disobedience and lambasted the fueros as sinister separatism. Rodezno as minister prevented the publication of his harangue in the press except Arriba, firmly controlled by Falange. It is partially thanks to his efforts that Navarre was, together with Álava, the only province which retained some regional establishments. According to his account of Esteban Bilbao, he was supported by Rodezno when objecting to homogenisation designs of Minister of Economy.

Though apparently overwhelmed fascistoid nature of the emerging regime and by actual shape of the unification - up to contributing to its failure in Navarre - Rodezno kept pursuing the collaborative line even when it became painfully evident that Carlism was entirely marginalized in the new state party. In 1943 Rodezno resigned from the Navarrese government to enter the Francoist quasi-parliament, Cortes Españolas; he was ensured its mandate as member of Consejo Nacional. The term lasted three years and was not renewed in 1946, which suggests that at that time he had already dropped out from the Falangist executive. None of the sources consulted provides information as to if and when Rodezno ceased as member of Consejo Nacional and Junta Politica. Auto of judge Garzon raises charges based on Rodezno's role in FET between April 20, 1937 (coincides with the day of his nomination to Secretariado) and 1951 (no daily date).

Juanista

Don Javier on the cover of a Carlist periodical

Already in the 1910s Rodezno timidly advanced the idea of transferring legitimist rights to an appropriate Alfonsist candidate once the Carlist dynasty would extinguish; also during the Republican years he was the most enthusiastic supporter of rapprochement within the monarchist camp and in 1935 proposed that Don Alfonso Carlos names Don Juan his legitimate heir. When the last direct Carlist claimant indeed died in September 1936 Rodezno was the last to acknowledge the regency of Don Javier. At that time he was already considering another regency, this of Franco on behalf of Don Juan, whom he held well familiar with Traditionalist ideas. It is not clear when the two first met; during the Civil War Rodezno and the Alfonsist prince already exchanged friendly correspondence. Rodezno was in touch with Don Juan since 1937 and considered him knowledgeable of Traditionalist ideas.

In the early 1940s Rodezno turned into an open advocate of Don Juan as a future Carlist king, especially once the latter inherited the Alfonsist title after his late father in 1941. Theoretically this support did not breach the rules of Don Javier's regency, which permitted forming factions around prospective candidates; in practice this mattered little, as Rodezno was already expulsed from the Comunión. When the new Alfonsist claimant was assembling a team of collaborators, José María Oriol travelled to meet him in Lausanne to suggest (in vain) that Rodezno is nominated the official Alfonsist representative in Spain. In the mid-1940s Fal mounted an offensive offering various Carlist regentialist solutions to Franco; in December 1945 Fal also wrote to Don Juan asking him to acknowledge the regency of Don Javier. As a response, in April 1945 Rodezno travelled to Portugal to meet Don Juan and prepare ground for his Carlist legitimization. The initiative bore fruit in February 1946, when the Alfonsist claimant signed a Rodezno co-drafted document, intended to confirm his Traditionalist spirit. Known as "Bases institucionales para la restauracion de la monarquia" or simply as "Bases de Estoril", it outlined the basics of the future monarchy. They very much resembled the Traditionalist principles, though the document fell short of declaring Don Juan the legitimate Carlist claimant.

Juan de Borbón

The 1946 "Bases de Estoril" was the last major Rodezno's initiative and little is known either about his political views or about his public activity in the very last years of his life. In 1944 he entered Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación. He remained leader of informal but very significant collaborative and pro-Juanista faction of Carlism, the movement which as a whole was rapidly disintegrating into even more branches. Though most Carlist rank-and-file remained utterly hostile to the despised Liberal dynasty, many if not the majority of Carlist pre-war leadership inclined towards accepting Don Juan. Also after Rodezno's death they kept pursuing the idea of Alfonso XIII's son assuming the Carlist title. Named Rodeznistas, Juancarlistas, Juanistas or Estorilos they officially declared Don Juan the legitimate Carlist heir in 1957, the act considered climax of the earlier Rodezno's policy. In 1957 around 70 Carlist politicians travelled to Estoril and declared Don Juan the legitimate Carlist heir. The late Rodezno was considered "principal promoter" of the initiative. Some authors even claim that Rodezno was present at the ceremony. In historiography the term "Rodeznistas" is last applied to the year 1959.

Legacy and reception

old banner (now unused)

During Francoism Rodezno was honored by a number of prestigious orders, like Cruz de Isabel la Católica or Cruz de San Raimundo de Peñafort; in the mid-1940s he entered Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación and Real Academia de la Historia, named also hijo predilecto by the province of Navarre and by his native town of Villafranca. Posthumously Franco conferred upon him Grandeza de España, title currently born by his descendants. Some streets and plazas were named upon him, the most prestigious one in Pamplona.

After transition to democracy the perception of Rodezno changed dramatically. In the current Spanish public discourse he is associated mostly with the most repressive phase of Francoism. Naming of the Pamplona plaza was subject to heated public debate in Navarre and elsewhere following adoption of ley de Símbolos de Navarra and ley de Memoria Histórica. The 2008-2009 discussion, involving present-day political parties and related to some present-day political issues, has eventually led to renaming the plaza to "Conde de Rodezno", an aristocratic title formally not associated with any individual, until in 2016 it was renamed to "Plaza de la Libertad". The former Pamplona mausoleum erected during Francoism to honor the fallen requetés has been renamed to "Sala de exposiciónes Conde de Rodezno" but in public it prefers to be named "Sala de exposiciónes". In unrestrained cyberspace Rodezno is at times referred to as "fascist to the core". In 2008 Audiencia Nacional, the Spanish high tribunal, launched formal bid to acknowledge Rodezno as guilty of crimes against humanity during his tenure as Minister of Justice and afterwards, but the motion bore no fruit due to procedural reasons. Judge Baltasar Garzón was later charged with perversion of justice for launching the bid, which was defined as an error by the Supreme Court of Spain. In 2010 a group of authors associated with a Pamplonese Ateneo Basilio Lacort published a vehemently militant work which presents Rodezno as a criminal.

former placard (now removed)

In Traditionalist historiographical narration Rodezno is one of the black characters, among the likes of Rafael Maroto, Alejandro Pidal or Don Carlos Hugo. He is charged with blatant political miscalculation at best and with treason of principles and kings at worst. His vacillating stance during the Mellista crisis in 1914-1919, rapprochement towards the Alfonsinos in the Republic years or bypassing Carlist command when pushing for almost unconditional adherence to the generals' coup of 1936 are less of an issue; it is Rodezno's stance on unification and pro-Juanista lobbying which earned him most hostility from works of Partido Carlista sponsored socialismo autogestionario supporters. Though scholars speculate on his different motives, the opinion which gained particular popularity is that he has never been a genuine Carlist, adhering to the movement mostly out of respect for his father. None of the currently existing organizations claiming Carlist identity, be it either those pursuing a socialist path (javierocarlistas, Partido Carlista) or those attached to Traditionalist values (tronovacantista CTC, sixtinos, carloctavistas) admits deference to his name.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b Unclear.
  2. ^ sequential artistocratic title quoted after Diputacion Permanente y Consejo de la Grandeza de Espana y Titulos del Reino service, available here. However, there are conflicting views on which count in sequence he was. According to different sources, Tomás' mother was the 5th condesa de Rodezno, or the 6th condesa de Rodezno. Yet another version, incomplete and erroneous, is pursued at Euskalnet service.
  3. ^ sequential number is unclear. He is considered the 12th marquis by the Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco, and the 13th marquis by Fz. de Bobadilla.
  4. ^ some sources wrongly claim he died in 1920, e.g. Geneall.net, however 1931 is the correct date of his death.
  5. ^ probably between 1878 (the amnesty) and 1882 (birth of Tomás)
  6. ^ compare Palacio del Conde Rodezno entry at definde service, available here
  7. ^ also the birthplace of Tomás, the older of their two children, is disputed; most scholarly sources claim he was born Madrid; this version is repeated on the official senate site allegedly after the birth certificate reproduced, though handwriting is entirely illegible. Obituaries claimed he was born in Villafranca or in Pamplona; both give the birth date as 1883, not 1882.
  8. ^ some sources claim that he headed Castilla la Nueva y Extremadura.
  9. ^ like in 1911. Some authors consider him a politician who betrayed Carlism in 1911, allegedly mounting a coalition with the Integrists and the Conservatives.
  10. ^ his mother held 2 titles, condesa de Rodezno and condesa de Valdellano. The first one was inherited by Tomás, the second one by his younger brother José María.
  11. ^ Domínguez Romera inherited the title from maternal line in 1911.
  12. ^ later on, in 1919, he grew to vice-president of the organisation.
  13. ^ in 1912 he published Un Infante de Navarra, yerno del Cid and in 1913 De tiempos lejanos. Glosas históricas, both in Revista de Historia y Genealogia
  14. ^ his 1915 and 1916 articles on genealogy are available online
  15. ^ see his Arturo Campión. Semblanza literaria, published in Diario de Navarra between 20.1.12 and 18.02.12
  16. ^ his 1952 obituary also referred to him as ex-alcalde de Villafranca but specified no period of his term in office, see ABC 19.08.52, available here
  17. ^ periodically serving also as dean of the Navarrese deputies and senators. At that time the strength of Carlism was at its peak in the province, with the movement gaining 70–85% of deputy seats available and controlling the remaining pool by means of electoral alliances. Some authors maintain that Domínguez Romera was jefe of Navarrese Carlism and that his son "inherited" the post; this claim about Domínguez Romero's Navarrese jefatura is not confirmed elsewhere. Until 1916 the Navarrese jefe was Francisco Martinez, and after 1916 it was Romualdo Cesareo Sanz Escartin.
  18. ^ Villafranca was part of the Peralta zone, itself forming the Tafalla electoral district.
  19. ^ by their opponents both Domínguez Romera and Domínguez Arévalo were presented as "cuneros".
  20. ^ both candidates won in two out of 4 comarcas of the district, but Domínguez Arévalo won in more populous ones.
  21. ^ some authors claim that Domínguez was from his youth a "fiel seguidor desde su juventud de Juan Vázquez de Mella"
  22. ^ the opinion of Melchor Ferrer, approvingly repeated in Andrés Martín (2000).
  23. ^ the Carlist king Jaime III was over 50 and still a bachelor; he had no brothers and his uncle was over 70 with no descendants
  24. ^ this stand was lambasted as "dishonor" by the orthodox Jaimistas.
  25. ^ another historian claims he followed de Mella.
  26. ^ his counter-candidate gained 55.8% of the votes.
  27. ^ however, he is recorded as not particularly averse towards the dictatorship. Having learnt of his Villafranca mayorship Luis Hernando de Larramendi asked Rodezno: "pero cómo puedes soportar eso?", to which the latter replied "mira chico, el caso es mandar".
  28. ^ which at that time formed part of the Burgos archdiocese.
  29. ^ entire book available here
  30. ^ as a historian he blamed the second wife of Carlos VII, Bertha de Rohan, for his alleged ineptitude during late phases of his life, when he "no era el arriscado caudillo de Navarra de 1873."
  31. ^ some even blame him for the 1894 events, when 800 soldiers protected estate of his grandfather during social unrest in Villafranca.
  32. ^ Blinkhorn (2008) claims also that Rodezno owned a señorio in La Rioja.
  33. ^ and quote him as examplary case of a link between landownership and power.
  34. ^ he had 502 robadas in Villafranca, divided into 47 fincas. Given a robada was ca 0,09 ha his estate covered some 45 ha and was far behind largest estates in the area, exceeding even 100 ha. In Carmona he and his wife held 200 ha. The estates did not make an impressive figure by national Spanish standards; as late as in 1919 duque de Peñaranda possessed 51,000 ha. In the sole Cordoba district there were around 30 landholders with estates exceeding 1,000 ha (surface area is listed in fanegas (fgs), a fanega differed from province to province, though one scholar suggests an average of 1 fg was 1,044 ha for the nearby Almeria province.
  35. ^ like the minister of economy, meeting with a group of "cerealistas" in 1926, and the minister of infrastructure in 1930.
  36. ^ in 1926 he published La propiedad privada en Navarra, y un informe sobre reforma tributaria
  37. ^ Another Carlist elected from Navarre was Joaquin Beunza. Detailed analysis in Serrano Moreno 1988, and 1989.
  38. ^ highlighting differences between "these" [Basque] provinces and Kingdom of Navarre.
  39. ^ in 1935 Rodezno pressed Don Alfonso Carlos to nominate Don Juan as heredero.
  40. ^ what was meant by that was probably strong leadership and organizational build-up of the party and its satellite structures; some Carlists grumbled at uninspiring mediocre Fal compared to eloquent and gregarious Rodezno.
  41. ^ including the paramilitary. However, it was Rodezno who agreed to a send few Carlists, together with Alfonsists conspirators, to Rome; the objective was military training, negotiating financial support and arms supply.
  42. ^ "El jefe delegado ideal es Rodezno. Solo le falta fe en lo nuestro"
  43. ^ he also visited in prison Jose Antonio.
  44. ^ Fal demanded that Republican regime is replaced with corporative Catholic state, possibly a monarchy, and insurgency is directed by a directory headed by Sanjurjo and including two civilians acceptable to the Comunión. Mola insisted on Republican regime and state separated from the Church, with insurgency commanded by the military at their own discretion.
  45. ^ he considered purely a Carlist rising "a ludicrous dream" and nurtured no doubt that alliances are needed; Republic should be overthrown as first objective, with further goals to be discussed later. What interested him was not so much the total victory of Carlism – attractive as that was – as obtaining of certain minimum gains plus control over their own corner of Spain.
  46. ^ some authors claim that Fal refrained from taking steps against the Navarrese junta conscious that also the Navarrese rank-and-file were more than enthusiastic to join the insurgency regardless of the terms agreed.
  47. ^ who initially opposed compromising 100 years of Carlist history in exchange for local ayuntamientos.
  48. ^ its basic lines were that Carlists may conditionally use monarchical flag, provisional government would be apolitical with civilian members, Republican legislation rectified, parties would be abolished and "new state" would be built.
  49. ^ Fal, heading the Military Section, settled in Toledo.
  50. ^ some scholars claim JCCNG was "liderada por el conde de Rodezno", though other authors maintain that it was formally headed by Berasain. Its official constituting document does not contain the name of Rodezno at all.
  51. ^ the rodeznista-controlled El Pensamiento Navarro wrote that "monarchists live even if kings die", a rather ambiguous statement given Carlists had a regent not a monarch now.
  52. ^ compare graphs and tables in Parejo Fernández (2008).
  53. ^ details in del Burgo Tajadura (1992).
  54. ^ Canal (2000) gives the date as January 1937.
  55. ^ noting that though he considered the idea of a Carlist military academy tempting, at the same time he did not approve of the way Fal pursued it.
  56. ^ the first meeting recorded was with Sancho Davila in early January 1937.
  57. ^ early March Rodezno moved to his Caceres estate and remained there until April 12, when he was summoned to Burgos by Franco. No scholar clarifies the reasons for his temporary withdrawal.
  58. ^ according to his own account, when summoned to Burgos on April 12 he told Franco that in Portugal it had not been necessary to create partido unico, to which Franco replied that Salazar did not enjoy popular support. The caudillo made clear that unification would not be transitory phase but an ultimate objective.
  59. ^ most thorough account of Carlist response to the unification threat in Bernaldo (1996); somewhat less detailed but still very informative chapters in Pérez (2008).
  60. ^ Bernaldo (1996) prefers to talk about "carlismo regional" prevailing over "carlismo nacional"; he also notes that one of the factors enhancing position of JCCGN over JNG was that there were still new requeté tercios being formed in Navarre in the spring of 1937
  61. ^ "organización estatal que reconozca las peculiaridades regionales" Until mid-1937 Rodezno believed that decentralised vision based on "autarquias regionales" was possible and called not to revert to "centralismo liberal".
  62. ^ most Carlists might have understood this as future instauration of a Carlist dynasty, e.g. the Borbón-Parmas, the Borbón-Habsburgos or other, Rodezno has probably meant a dynastical accord with the Alfonsinos, most likely with Franco nominated regent for Don Juan de Borbón.
  63. ^ some authors refer to this body as Junta Política or Secreteria General. In official Francoist document the body was referred to as "Secretariado o Junta Política".
  64. ^ the other three were Luis Arellano, Tomás Dolz de Espejo and José María Mazón Sainz
  65. ^ he was also susprised and concerned by detention of Manuel Hedilla. Franco assured Rodezno that Traditionalist doctrine will be embodied in outlook of the new party "en su dia"
  66. ^ opinions of Payne, Canal, Blinkhorn, and Fraser, approvingly referred by Pérez (2008).
  67. ^ detailed discussion in Peñalba Sotorrío 2013, especially the chapter Conflictos y tensiones durante el periodo de integracion. Un analisis estadistico, pp. 91-105. The province where most formal complaints were received was the Integrist stronghold, Seville (220), followed by Navarre (169) and the Catalan provinces, Cadiz and Ourense (60-90).
  68. ^ at this point Secretariado Politico ceased to function; in fact, Rodezno ceased to take part in its sittings already in August 1937. Within its ranks the Carlists were even worse-off, only 11 of them among its 50 members. Canal (2000) claims there were 12 Carlists, while Payne (1987) claims the correct number is 13.
  69. ^ dubbed "el traidor por unas alcaldías".
  70. ^ though he does not mention Rodezno personally, also Payne points to this feature. Putting common goal against particularisms on the Nationalist side is also confronted with internal power struggle within the Republican camp.
  71. ^ version coined mostly by Melchor Ferrer, Historia del Tradicionalismo Español, vol XXIX, referred after Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 183; another scholar seems to adhere, noting that Rodezno also sided with "corriente conservadora autoritaria" rather than with "populismo tradicionalista".
  72. ^ according to this approach, unlike ideologically driven Fal, Rodezno was above all a realist who considered that ideal of a purely Carlist seizure of power as a dream. Alliances were inevitable and as its result, Carlists might have to settle for the second-best option. This does not necessarily boil down to the "dead-end street" vision of Carlism; Rodezno viewed it as a spiritual and ideological force guiding a new formation, built possibly on a new monarchist but fundamentally Traditionalist platform.
  73. ^ though the law itself was drafted by Gónzalez Bueno.
  74. ^ he took part in the plot intended to counter takeover of El Pensamiento Navarro by the Francoist press conglomerate by converting it into a formally commercial newspaper, owned by a company named Editorial Navarra; Rodezno became its primary shareholder with 600 shares, other major owners were Luis Arellano (150 shares), and the Baleztena brothers (50 each).
  75. ^ he founded and became the first president of Principe de Viana, formally the cultural institution managed by the Navarrese provincial government.
  76. ^ detailed discussion in Bari (2013), and Etxeberria (2006).
  77. ^ at one point in 1938 he told Franco: "mi general, la doctrina tradicionalista no es el fascismo".
  78. ^ he anyway acknowledged that "un año habia bastado para apreciar que era imposible de fraguar la unificación y menos en Navarra, donde el desengaño cundia entre los nuestros".
  79. ^ monarchist alliance concept was made easier by Don Javier's unhappy absence in 1944-1945, when he was held captive in the Nazi concentration camp.
  80. ^ "religion, unidad, monarquia, and representacion organica".
  81. ^ carloctavistas, sivattistas, javieristas, rodeznistas
  82. ^ picture taken in 2007. For 2012 banner, see here
  83. ^ like the question of Navarrismo and the Basque role in Navarre
  84. ^ it might refer to Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, but also to his father Tomás Domínguez Romera, his maternal grandfather Justo Arévalo y Escudero or previous holders of the title from the Jiménez-Navarro family.
  85. ^ like Clemente 1977, 1999, and 2011, or Pérez-Nievas Borderas 1999, to scholarly discourse flavored by political sympathies like Martorell Pérez 2009, to orthodox Traditionalist discourse of Alcalá 2001.
  86. ^ "Rodezno no sentía el carlismo, no pensó nunca en su triunfo y, con su característica ligereza, podría decirse que lo aceptaba como aquel personaje de Valle Inclán que lo quería declarar monumento nacional (...) Sus opiniones pro-alfonsinas acrecentaban el confusionismo de unos y los recelos de los leales. Cuando al fin dio el paso definitivo, reconociendo públicamente como su Rey al pretendiente Don Juan, coronaba una historia política de una lógica implacable, pero aquel día perdía la única virtud que, en los salones aristocráticos, tenía el Conde de Rodezno: el mantenerse leal a la dinastía legítima", opinion of Melchor Ferrer quoted after Martorell Pérez 2009.

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